The Prince author by Niccolo Machiavelli. As a young Florentine envoy to the courts of France and the Italian principalities, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) was able to observe firsthand the lives of people strongly united under one powerful ruler. His fascination with that political rarity and his intense desire to see the Medici family assume a similar role in Italy provided the foundation for his “primer for princes.” In this classic guide to acquiring and maintaining political power, Machiavelli used a rational approach to advise prospective rulers, developing logical arguments and alternatives for a number of potential problems, among and the treatment of conquered peoples.
Refreshing in its directness, yet often disturbing in its cold practicality, The Prince sets down a frighteningly pragmatic formula for political fortune. Starkly relevant to the political upheavals of the 20th century, this calculating prescription for power remains a timely and startling lesson in the practice of autocratic rule.
I. Of the Various Kinds of Princedom, and of the Ways in Which They Are Acquired
II. Of Hereditary Princedoms
III. Of Mixed Princedoms
IV. Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander,Did Not, on Alexander’s Death, Rebel against His
V .How Cities or Provinces Which before Their Acquisition Have lived under Their Own I ws Are to Be Governed
VI. Of New Princedoms Which a Prince Acquires with His Own Arms and by Merit
VII. Of New Princedoms Acquired by the Aid of Others and by Good Fortune
VIII. Of Those Who by Their Crimes Come to Be Princes
IX. Of the Civil Princedom
X. How the Strength of All Princedoms Should Be Measured
XI. Of Ecclesiastical Princedoms
XII. How Many Different Kinds of Soldiers There Are, and of Mercenaries
XIII. Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and National Arms
XIV. Of the Duty of a Prince in Respect of Military Affairs
XV. Of the Qualities in Respect of Which Men, and Most of All Princes, Are Praised or Blamed
XVI. Of Liberality and Miserliness
XVII. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better to Be Loved or Feared
XVIII. How Princes Should Keep Faith
XIX. That a Prince Should Seek to Escape Contempt and Hatred
XX. Whether Fortresses, and Certain Other Expedients to which prince often have resource , Are profitable or harmful
XXI. How a Prince Should Bear Himself So as to Acquire Reputation
XXII. Of the Secretaries of Princes .
XXIII That Flatterers Should Be Shunned
XIV. Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States
XXV. What Fortune Can Effect in Human Affairs and How She May Be Withstood
XXVI. An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians
OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF PRINCEDOM, AND OF THE WAYS IN WHICH THEY ARE ACQUIRED ALL THE STATES and Governments by which men are or ever have been ruled, have been and are either Republics or Princedoms. Princedoms are either hereditary, in which the sovereignty is derived through an ancient line of ancestors, or they are new New Princedoms are either wholly new, as that of Milan to Francesco Sforza; or they are like limbs joined on to the hereditary possessions of the Prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples to the dominions of the King of Spain. The States thus acquired have either been used to live under a Prince or have been free; and he who acquires them does so either by his own arms or by the arms of others, and either by good fortune or by merit.
OF HEREDITARY PRINCEDOMS OF REPUBLICS I shall not now speak, having elsewhere spoken of them at length. Here I shall treat exclusively of Princedoms, and, filling in the outline above traced out, shall proceed to examine how such States are to be governed and maintained. I say, then, that hereditary States, accustomed to the family of their Prince, are maintained with far less difficulty than new States, since all that is required is that the Prince shall not depart from the usages of his ancestors, trusting for the rest to deal with events as they arise. So that if an hereditary Prince be of average address, he will always maintain himself in his Princedom, unless deprived of it by some extraordinary and irresistible force; and even if so deprived will recover it, should any, even the least, mishap overtake the usurper.
We have in Italy an example of this in the Duke of Ferrara, who never could have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in 1484, nor those of Pope Julius in 1510, had not his authority in that State been consolidated by time. For since a Prince by birth has fewer occasions and less need to give offense, he ought to be better loved, and will naturally be popular with his subjects unless outrageous vices make him odious. Moreover, the very antiquity and continuance of his rule will efface the memories and causes which lead to innovation. For one change always leaves a dovetail into which another will fit.
OF MIXED PRINCEDOMS BUT IN NEW Princedoms difficulties abound. And, first, if the Princedom be not wholly new, but joined on to the ancient dominions of the Prince, so as to form with them what may be termed a mixed Princedom, changes will come from a cause common to all new States, namely, that men, thinking to better their condition, are always ready to change masters, and in this expectation will take up arms against any ruler; wherein they deceive themselves, and find afterwards by experience that they are worse off than before.
This again results naturally and necessarily from the circumstance that the Prince cannot avoid giving offense to his new subjects, either in respect of the troops he quarters on them, or of some other of the numberless vexations attendant on a new acquisition. And in this way you may find that you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing the Princedom, yet cannot keep the friend you have injured in seizing the Princedom, yet cannot keep the friend-ship of those who helped you to gain it; since you can neither reward them as they expect, nor yet, being under obligations to them, use violent remedies against them.
For however strong you may be in respect of your army, it is essential that in entering a new Province you should have the good will of its inhabitants. Hence it happened that Louis XII of France, speedily gaining possession of Milan, as speedily lost it; and that on the occasion of its first capture, Lodovico Sforza was able with his own forces only to take it from him. For the very people who had opened the gates to the French
King, when they found themselves deceived in their expectations and hopes of future benefits, could not put up with the insolence of their new ruler. True it is that when a State rebels and is again got under, it will not afterwards be lost so easily. For the Prince, using the rebellion as a pretext, will not scruple to secure himself by punishing the guilty, bringing the suspected to trial, and otherwise strengthening his position in the points where it was weak.
So that if to recover Milan from the French it was enough on the first occasion that a Duke Lodovico should raise alarms on the frontiers, to wrest it from them a second time the whole world had to be ranged against them, and their armies destroyed and driven out of Italy. And this for the reasons above assigned, And yet, for a second time, Milan was lost to the King. The general causes of its first loss have been shown.
It remains to note the causes of the second, and to point out the remedies which the French King had, or which might have been used by another in like circumstances to maintain his conquest more successfully than he did. I say, then, that those States which upon their acquisition are joined on to the ancient dominions of the Prince who acquires them, are either of the same Province and tongue as the people of these dominions, or they are not. When they are, there is a great ease in retaining them, especially when they have not been accustomed to live in freedom.
To hold them securely it is enough to have rooted out the line of the reigning Prince; because if in other respects the old condition of things be continued, and there be no discordance in their customs, men live peaceably with one another, as we see to have been the case in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have so long been united to France. For although there be some slight difference in their languages, their customs are similar, and they can easily get on together. He, therefore, who acquires such a State, if he mean to keep it, must see to two things; first, that the blood of the ancient line of Princes be destroyed; second, that no change be made in respect of laws or taxes; for in this way the newly acquired State speedily becomes incorporated with the hereditary.
i But when States are acquired in a country differing in language, usages, and laws, difficulties multiply, and great good fortune, as well as address, is needed to overcome them. One of the best and most efficacious methods for dealing with such a State, is for the Prince who acquires it to go and dwell there in person, since this will tend to make his tenure more secure and lasting. This course has been followed by the Turk with regard to Greece, who, had he not, in addition to all his other precautions for securing that Province, himself come to live in it, could… Continue please …..buy now and Red …